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1 Abstract
Hypothesis tests are a crucial statistical tool for data
mining and are the workhorse of scientific research in
many fields. Here we present a differentially private
analogue of the classic Wilcoxon signed-rank hypoth-
esis test, which is used when comparing sets of paired
(e.g., before-and-after) data values. We present not
only a private estimate of the test statistic, but a
method to accurately compute a p-value and assess
statistical significance. We evaluate our test on both
simulated and real data. Compared to the only ex-
isting private test for this situation, that of Task and
Clifton, we find that our test requires less than half
as much data to achieve the same statistical power.
2 Introduction
Consider a scenario where a medical researcher mea-
sures a patient’s blood pressure before and after a
particular intervention. Once the data is obtained,
the researcher wants to determine whether the in-
tervention had any effect, or whether the difference
between the two samples was just random variation.
The data generated in this study is an example of
paired-sample data, where there exists a natural link
between the two measurements of the same individ-
ual. This is a common form of data in scientific re-
search, and one of the traditional methods to check
for the signficance of an effect is the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test [30]. This test does not require any addi-
tional assumptions about the data (e.g., that it was
normally distributed), and so it can be used on social
network data and other data for which it may not be
appropriate to assume normality.
Unfortunately, in many of the use cases for the
Wilcoxon test, the data in question is private and
sensitive (e.g., medical records, financial records or
social network data). Ethical and legal concerns pre-
vent the easy sharing of this data. Frequently, re-
search cannot be done because the owners of existing
data are not willing to accept the risk inherent in
entrusting this data to a third party. Even if the
researcher is entrusted with access to the data, the
researcher themselves must now decide what they can
publish. The release of even just summary statistics
has led to privacy violations [11], but without the
release of some results the research is pointless.
Differential privacy provides a criterion that is suf-
ficient to provably guarantee that the results of a par-
ticular query on a database do not violate individual
privacy. Differential privacy generally requires the
query be randomized, with the output usually aim-
ing to approximate the result of a non-private query
as accurately as possible. Years of research have re-
sulted in a variety of effective algorithms for differen-
tially private queries, allowing the approximation of
everything from histograms [8] to regression model
coefficients [17, 31, 32] to classifiers from machine
learning algorithms [4, 21].
In this paper we provide an algorithm that car-
ries out a private analogue of the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test. A private version of the test will always
have lower statistical power than the classical version,
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meaning that more data is needed before a given ef-
fect can be distinguished from random noise. The
first differentially private analogue of the Wilcoxon
test was given by Task and Clifton in 2016 [23]. Here
we strive to improve on that result, introducing a new
test with higher power.
In a hypothesis test, a test statistic is computed
and compared to a reference distribution to see if
it is abnormally high. The difficulty of developing
a private test comes not just from the need to pri-
vately approximate a test statistic, but also from the
need to rigorously define “abnormally high.” It is
not sufficient to treat the approximate test statistic
as equivalent to its non-private counterpart.
The key contributions of this work are as follows:
A new private test statistic We estimate not
the standard Wilcoxon test statistic but a variant in-
troduced by Pratt in 1959 [14]. We argue that this
variant is more amenable to being privatized without
losing its utility. We prove a bound on its sensitivity
and provide a private algorithm for approximating
this statistic.
Accurate p-value calculation We show how to
calculate an accurate p-value that takes into account
the noise added for privacy. We do this through sim-
ulation, numerically approximating (to a high degree
of accuracy) the relevant reference distribution. This
is a more exact method than the upper bounds given
in prior work.
Experimental implementation We implement
our algorithm and measure its power. We also im-
plement the test of Task and Clifton and along the
way correct a significant error in their work. We then
compare the two tests and find that ours can detect
the same effect with only 40% of the data needed pre-
viously, closing the majority of the gap between the
private and public versions of the test. The source
code for our implementation is publicly available.1
1Our code is available at:
http://www.github.com/simonpcouch/wilcoxon
3 Background
We begin by outlining some background on hypothe-
sis testing, followed by some specifics on the Wilcoxon
signed-rank test. We then discuss differential privacy
and previous applications of differentially private hy-
pothesis testing.
3.1 Hypothesis Testing
Hypothesis testing is a very common form of data
analysis, particularly in applied scientific research.
The goal of a hypothesis test is to measure whether a
particular data set is consistent with a given theory
describing how the data is generated. This theory is
called the null hypothesis (H0). For example, given
blood pressure data before and after some treatment,
researchers might want to determine if the change
they see could plausibly be consistent with a null hy-
pothesis that the treatment has no effect and the ob-
served effect is due only to sampling variability.
To make this determination, a test statistic, t,
is computed. Given a function f for computing a
test statistic, one can determine analytically, through
simulation, or via large sample approximation, the
distribution that the statistic T = f(X) would have
when the database X is drawn randomly according to
H0.
2 One can then compute a p-value, defined as the
probability that a test statistic as or more extreme
than that observed would occur under H0.
Definition 3.1. For an observed database x , the
test statistic t = f(x), and a null hypothesis H0, the
p-value is defined as
Pr[T ≥ t | T = f(X) and X← H0].
Low p-values indicate that the test statistic is more
extreme than is likely by random chance and may
cause a researcher to reject H0 as a plausible expla-
nation of the data. Normally a threshold value α is
chosen and H0 is rejected if p < α. The chosen value
for α determines the type I error rate, the probability
of incorrectly rejecting if the null hypothesis is true.
2We use the convention of denoting random variables with
a capital roman letter and a particular value taken by that
random variable with a lowercase roman letter.
2
The value of t at which p = α, which we will denote
t∗, is called the critical value.
Hypothesis tests are judged by their statistical
power. This is a measure of how likely the test is to
detect an effect and reject the null hypothesis when
it is indeed false. Statistical power is a function of
the amount of data and the particular alternate dis-
tribution (i.e., the effect size).
Definition 3.2. For a given alternate data distri-
bution HA, the statistical power of a hypothesis test
is
Pr[T ≥ t∗ | T = f(X) and X← HA].
A primary goal of hypothesis test design is to find
tests with high power. In classical statistics there are
many hypothesis tests that have been proven to be
optimal for a large set of use cases.
3.2 Wilcoxon Signed-Rank Test
Consider again the example where researchers want
to see if a treatment caused a change in blood pres-
sure. A standard hypothesis test for this situation is
the Wilcoxon signed-rank test, proposed in 1945 by
Frank Wilcoxon [30]. This test evaluates the differ-
ence between values obtained from two paired sam-
ples (such as subjects before and after treatment, hus-
bands and wives, etc.) to see if they plausibly come
from the same distribution. The test assumes that all
pairs are independent, random draws from a distribu-
tion with an ordinal scale. In the public setting, when
the data is known to be normally distributed, the
t-test consistently outperforms the Wilcoxon. How-
ever, the Wilcoxon test does not assume normality,
which is beneficial when the underlying distribution
of the sample data is not known.
The function calculating the Wilcoxon test statistic
is formalized in Algorithm W. Given a database x
containing sets of pairs (ui, vi), the test computes the
difference di of each pair, drops any with di = 0, and
then ranks them by magnitude. (If magnitudes are
equal for several differences, all are given a rank equal
to the average rank for that set.) If si = ±1 is the
sign of di and ri is its rank, then w =
∑
i siri.
Example 3.3. Table 1 presents an example database
containing five data elements. The values ui and vi
Algorithm W : Wilcoxon Test Statistic
Calculation
Input: x
begin
for row i of x do
di ←− |vi − ui|
si ←− Sign(vi − ui)
Order the terms from lowest to highest di
Drop any di = 0
for row i of x do
ri ←− rank of row i
w ←−∑i siri
Output: w
are inputs in the database and di and si are the re-
sults of the initial stage of computation.
Table 1: Initial Table
i ui vi di si
1 9 18 9 1
2 2 11 9 1
3 3 3 0 -
4 8 10 2 1
5 9 8 1 -1
In table 2 we sort the elements in increasing order
by di. We drop i = 3 because d3 = 0. We then
compute ranks. Because there is a tie for ranks 3
and 4, we set the rank of these values to 3.5.
Table 2: Final Table
i d s r
5 1 -1 1
4 2 1 2
1 9 1 3.5
2 9 1 3.5
We then compute the test statistic
w =
∑
i
siri = 3.5 · 1 + 3.5 · 1 + 2 · 1 + 1 · (−1) = 8.
Under the null hypothesis that ui and vi are drawn
from the same distribution, the distribution of the
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test statistic W can be calculated exactly using com-
binatorial techniques. This becomes computationally
infeasible for large databases, but an approximation
exists in the form of the normal distribution with
mean 0 and variance nr(nr+1)(2nr+1)6 , where nr is the
number of rows that were not dropped. Knowing
this, one can calculate the p-value for any particular
value of w.
3.3 Differential Privacy
When working with data that contains sensitive infor-
mation about individuals, the need to publicly share
the result of the hypothesis test must be balanced
with the need to protect privacy. Unfortunately, tra-
ditional methods of handling sensitive data provide
poor privacy protections. Databases privatized with
ad hoc anonymization techniques (replacing names
with unique numeric identifiers, for example) have
frequently been attacked, resulting in substantial pri-
vacy violations [1, 22, 29]. Even summary statistics
can allow malicious actors to violate the privacy of
people in the database [11].
Differential privacy [8] is a definition that, when
satisfied, provably guarantees that the output of a
query cannot be used to infer anything about the
individuals who contributed to the database. Infor-
mally, it requires that for any individual, the query
output would be roughly the same for any value of
that individual’s data. To do this, the query mecha-
nism must be randomized. More formally:
Definition 3.4 (Differential Privacy). A randomized
algorithm f˜ on databases is -differentially private if
for all S ⊆ Range(f˜) and for databases x,x′ that
only differ in one row
Pr[f˜(x) ∈ S] ≤ exp() Pr[f˜(x′) ∈ S].
We say that x and x′ that differ only in one row
are neighboring databases and we call  the privacy
parameter. The user selects , which determines the
strength of the privacy.
One useful property of differential privacy is resis-
tance to post-processing, which ensures that no func-
tion of a differentially private algorithm can cause a
privacy loss [8].
Theorem 3.5 (Post Processing). Let f˜ be an -
differentially private randomized algorithm. Let g be
an arbitrary randomized algorithm. Then g ◦ f˜ is -
differentially private.
Resistance to post-processing is an important the-
orem for two reasons. First, any good privacy def-
inition must have this property (or something very
similar). If it didn’t, then the privacy of the output is
only superficial and some sort of analysis can extract
the private information. Secondly, this shows that
post-processing can be used to design private algo-
rithms. If one step of a computation is differentially
private, then as long as the rest of the computation
does not directly access the database, the result of
the full computation will be private as well. We use
this technique later.
One standard technique for creating differentially
private algorithms is the Laplace mechanism, intro-
duced by Dwork et al. in 2006 [8]. Given an arbitrary
(non-private) function f , the Laplace mechanism pro-
vides one way to create a private function f˜ that ap-
proximates f . To do this, one must first compute
the sensitivity of f , meaning the maximum effect a
change in a single row can have on the output.
Definition 3.6 (Sensitivity). The sensitivity of a
function f is
∆f = max
x,x′
|f(x)− f(x′)|,
where x and x′ are neighbouring databases.
The Laplace mechanism adds noise to f , where
the noise is sampled from a Laplace distribution, a
double-sided exponential distribution.
Definition 3.7 (Laplace Distribution). The Laplace
distribution (centered at 0) with scale b is the distri-
bution with probability density function:
Lap(x|b) = 1
2b
exp
(
− |x|
b
)
.
We usually write Lap(b) to denote the Laplace distri-
bution with scale b.
The Laplace mechanism simply adds noise pro-
duced from the Laplace distribution to the output
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of a function. The magnitude of the noise is deter-
mined by the choice of  and the sensitivity of the
function.
Definition 3.8 (Laplace Mechanism). Given any
function f , the Laplace mechanism is defined as:
f˜(x) = f(x) + Y,
where Y is drawn from Lap(∆f/), and ∆f is the
sensitivity of f .
The Laplace mechanism is one of the most com-
monly used methods to achieve differential privacy.
Dwork et al. [8] proved the following:
Theorem 3.9. (Laplace Mechanism) The Laplace
mechanism preserves -differential privacy.
3.4 Differentially Private Hypothesis
Tests
To carry out a differentially private hypothesis test,
one must first find a differentially private function f˜
that computes a useful test statistic. This could be
either a differentially private estimate of a standard
test statistic, or a completely new test statistic.3
In a testing framework, a test statistic is not a
meaningful output on its own; it is an intermediate
calculation on the way to a p-value. One cannot sim-
ply use the estimated statistic in place of the true one
and carry out a p-value computation as in the non-
private setting, as resultant p-values can be wildly
innacurate and artificially inflate the type I error rate
[3, 26]. Instead, one must compute a new reference
distribution modeling the distribution of f˜(X) when
X is generated under H0.
A fully developed differentially private hypothesis
test includes not just a method for computing the
test statistic, but also for computing the associated
p-value. The goal is to develop such a hypothesis test
and to achieve power as close as possible to what can
be achieved in the classic non-private setting. Just as
3We note here that our test statistics are now randomized,
rather than deterministic functions of the database. This ac-
tually causes very few mathematical issues, but it does mean
that the output of a hypothesis test on fixed data will not be
the same on each run.
each type of input data requires a separate hypothe-
sis test in the classical case, each type of input data
requires its own differentially private test.
3.5 Related Work
There is a significant body of work on differentially
private hypothesis testing, broadly construed, but
much of it takes a different approach than this work.
For example, some results (e.g., [18, 28, 19]) look
at how quickly various private approximations of
test statistics converge to their limiting distributions.
These are important theoretical results, but they do
not bring us to the point of practical, implementable
tests. There is often no discussion of a reasonable
reference distribution when the noise is not yet neg-
ligible, and the results are often purely asymptotic,
hiding potentially problematic constants.
The hypothesis test for which private variants have
been the most well-studied is the chi-squared test,
which tests whether two categorical variables could
plausibly be independent of each other.4 Vu and
Slavkovic´ [25] give differentially private versions of
a single proportion test and a chi-squared test with
clinical trial data in mind. They give accurate p-value
calculations that adjust for the added Laplace noise.
Several studies of private chi-squared tests have been
specifically intended for use with genome-wide asso-
ciation study (GWAS) data [9, 24, 12]. These pa-
pers make asymptotic arguments for the reliability
of their p-value calculations. Other work has used
Monte Carlo simulations to achieve higher precision
[10, 27]. Rogers and Kifer [15] instead proposes a new
statistic with an asymptotic distribution more similar
to its non-private analogue. While all of these papers
discuss private test statistics and many (but not all)
discuss the distribution of that statistic under the
null hypothesis, few carefully demonstrate the statis-
tical power of the resulting test. Rogers and Kifer
[15] and Gaboardi et al. [10] are notable exceptions,
giving power curves for several different approaches.
Methods for numerical (rather than categorical)
data are less well-developed. Some work has ad-
4There are variants of this test that can be used in slightly
different situations, like seeing of a certain set of categorical
data is consistent with a specified distribution.
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dressed testing the value of a mean or the difference of
means [20, 7, 6]. While there is a large body of work
on differentially private linear regression that aims
to output an accurate best-fit line, only recently has
work been done on using coefficients as test statistics
[16, 2]. (Such inference is near-ubiquitous in many
academic fields.) Campbell et al. [3] give a private
analogue of a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA)
test, and Nguyeˆn and Hui propose a test for surival
analysis data [13].
4 Our Algorithm
In this section, we will define our algorithm for the
differentially private Wilcoxon test and prove that
it is -differentially private. At a high level, our al-
gorithm is quite straightforward; we compute a test
statistic as one might in the public case and add
Laplacian noise to make it private. However, there
are several important innovations that greatly in-
crease the power of our test.
Our first innovation is to use a different variant of
the Wilcoxon test statistic. While the version intro-
duced in Section 3.2 is the one most commonly used,
other versions have long existed in the statistics liter-
ature. In particular, we look at a variant introduced
by Pratt in 1959 [14]. In this variant, rather than
dropping rows with di = 0, those rows are included.
When di = 0 we set si = Sign(di) = 0, so those rows
contribute nothing to the resultant statistic, but they
do push up the rank of other, non-tied rows. We
define the algorithm for this calculation, which we
denote WP, below.
This procedure is almost the same as that for the
calculation of the standard Wilcoxon test statistic,
but the small difference is crucial. In the sample
database given in 1, the Pratt variant produces the
values in Table 3.
The resulting statistic is
w =
∑
i
siri = 4.5 · 1 + 4.5 · 1 + 3 · 1 + 2 · (−1) = 10.
In the public setting, the Pratt variant is not very
different from the standard Wilcoxon, being slightly
more or less powerful depending on the exact effect
Algorithm WP: Wilcoxon Statistic - Pratt
Variant
Input: x
begin
for row i of x do
di ←− |vi − ui|
si ←− Sign(vi − ui)
Order the terms from lowest to highest di
for row i of x do
ri ←− rank of row i
w ←−∑i siri
Output: w
Table 3: Final Table (Pratt)
i d s r
3 0 0 1
5 1 -1 2
4 2 1 3
1 9 1 4.5
2 9 1 4.5
one is trying to detect [5]. In the private setting,
however, the difference is substantial.
The benefit to the Pratt variant comes from how
the test statistics are interpreted. In the standard
Wilcoxon, it is known that the test statistic follows
an approximately normal distribution, but the vari-
ance of that distribution is a function of nr, the num-
ber of non-zero di values. In the private setting, this
number is not known, and this has caused substan-
tial difficulty in prior work. (See Section 6 for more
discussion.) On the other hand, the Pratt variant
produces a test statistic that is always compared to
the same normal distribution, which depends only on
n.
4.1 The Private Test Statistic
Recall that x is a database and n is the size of the
database. The WP algorithm (above) produces the
public version of the Pratt-variant Wilcoxon statistic.
The algorithm W˜P that outputs the differentially
private analog is shown below.
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Algorithm W˜P : Private Wilcoxon Statistic
Input: x, 
begin
n←− the number of paired samples in x
w ←−WP(x)
w˜ ←− w + Lap
(
2n

)
Output: w˜
4.2 Proof of Differential Privacy
Theorem 4.1. Algorithm W˜P is -differentially
private.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the sensitivity of
WP is bounded by 2n. The privacy of the algorithm
then follows directly from Theorem 3.9.
Figure 1: x and x′ differ only in that dj is ”moved”
from region A2 to region A4.
Let x and x′ be neighbouring databases. Let row j
be the row that differs between x and x′. Let dj and
d′j indicate the difference between the data values in
row j in x and x′, respectively. Similarly, let rj and
r′j indicate the rank of row j in x and x
′. We assume
without loss of generality that d′j > dj .
We divide the rows of x (or x′) into five regions, A1
through A5. A1 is the set of rows i with di < dj . A2
is the set with di = dj . A3 has di values between dj
and d′j . A4 has di values equal to d
′
j . A5 has values
greater than d′j (though we don’t need to use A5 in
the proof). For convenience, we use ai to represent
the size of the set Ai in x.
As shown in Figure 1, x and x′ differ only in that
dj is “moved” from region A2 to region A4. Let w
and w′ be test statistics produced from databases x
and x′, respectively.
Recall that w =
∑
i siri. Let wi = siri be the
contribution of row i to this sum. We then want to
bound ∆w = |w − w′|. We similarly set ∆wi to be
|siri − s′ir′i|. Note that for i in A1 or A5 we have
∆wi = 0.
Next, we consider ∆wj the change in the term
corresponding to the row where the data changes.
As row j is tied with all other rows in region
A2, rj =
(a1+1)+(a1+a2)
2 =
2a1+a2+1
2 and r
′
j =
(a1+a2+a3)+(a1+a2+a3+a4)
2 =
2a1+2a2+2a3+a4
2 . In the
worst case, sj changes when the move occurs, so
∆wj < rj + r
′
j =
2a1 + a2 + 1
2
+
2a1 + 2a2 + 2a3 + a4
2
=
4a1 + 3a2 + 2a3 + a4 + 1
2
.
Now we consider ∆wi where i ∈ A2 (excluding
row j). As there is one fewer row tied, each of their
ranks (excluding row j) is changed from 2a1+a2+12 to
2a1+a2
2 , which means that each row is changed by
1
2 .
As there are a2 − 1 rows in this region, the contri-
bution to ∆w from this set of rows is bounded by
a2−1
2 .
Similarly, each of the row ranks (excluding row j)
in region A4 is changed from
2a1+2a2+2a3+a4+1
2 to
2a1+2a2+2a3+a4
2 as one more row is tied with rows
in A4. As there are a4 rows, ∆w from the rows in
region A4 is bounded by
a4
2 .
Now we consider region A3. As dj has moved from
before this region to after this region, each of the row
ranks is changed by 1. Therefore the contribution to
∆w from the rows in region A3 is bounded by a3.
It follows that
∆w = |w − w′|
≤ 4a1 + 3a2 + 2a3 + a4 + 1
2
+
a2 − 1
2
+
a4
2
+ a3
= 2a1 + 2a2 + 2a3 + a4
≤ 2(a1 + a2 + a3 + a4)
≤ 2n
Having bounded the sensitivity, the proof is com-
plete.
7
As we discussed previously, a test statistic on its
own is not useful for statistical inference. Given the
test statistic, we must calculate a p-value. In the
public case, we compare to a simple normal distri-
bution, but in the private case the distribution of w˜
under the null distribution is equal to the sum of a
normal and a Laplacian. This is difficult to compute
analytically, so we simply simulate a large number c
of draws from this distribution. (In our experiments,
c is set to 10 million. This gives a very accurate esti-
mate of p.) We combine everything into a final test
algorithm in Algorithm C˜ .
Algorithm C˜ : Complete Wilcoxon Test
Input: x , , c
begin
w˜ := W˜P(x, )
for k := 1 to c do
Wk ←−
Normal(0, n(n+1)(2n+1)/6)+Lap(2n/);
p←− fraction of Wk more extreme than w˜
Output: w˜, p
In this algorithm we draw our reference distribu-
tion (the Wk values) assuming there are no di = 0
rows. The distribution will technically differ slightly
when there are many rows with di = 0, but the dif-
ference is inconsequential in all but very extreme cir-
cumstances, and even then the calculations are overly
conservative. See Appendix A for more details.
Theorem 4.2. Algorithm C˜ is -differentially pri-
vate.
Proof. The computation of w˜ was already shown
to be private. The remaining computation needed
to find the p-value does not need access to the
database—it is simply post-processing. By Theorem
3.5, it follows that the complete algorithm is also pri-
vate.
5 Experimental Results
We assess the power of our differentially-private
Wilcoxon signed-rank test first on synthetic data.
(For tests with real data, see Section 7.) In order
to measure power, we must first fix an effect size.
We chose to have the ui and vi values both gener-
ated according to normal distributions with means
one standard deviation apart. We then measure the
statistical power of Algorithm C˜ (for a given choice of
n and ) by repeatedly randomly sampling a database
x from that distribution and then running C˜ on that
database.5 The power is the percentage of the time
C˜ returns a p-value less than α. (We use α = .05 in
all our experiments.)
We consider several values of . The lowest, .01 is
an extremely conservative privacy parameter and al-
lows for safe composition with many other queries of
comparable  value. In Figure 2, we also use s of .1
and 1, which, while higher, still provide very mean-
ingful privacy protection. Ultimately, the choice of
 is a question of policy and depends on the relative
weight placed on privacy and utility. We also mea-
sure for comparison the power of the standard, public
Wilcoxon test.6 As one might expect, the amount of
data needed to detect a given effect scales roughly
proportionately with 1/.
An important part of the algorithm design is the
treatment of rows with di = 0. In Figure 3, 30% of
rows have di = 0 and the other 70% are distributed
as before, with the two data points sampled from
normal distributions with means one standard devia-
tion apart. We find that while (as expected) all tests
lose power, but they lose very little and the relative
relationship between our tests and the non-private
Wilcoxon test is unchanged.
In a properly calibrated hypothesis test, the dis-
tribution of the p-values under H0 will be uniform,
indicating that the Type I error rate is exactly α. We
verified that Algorithm C˜ yields uniform p-values
under H0 in realistic settings. See Appendix A for
further discussion.
We also examine the power of our test at varying ef-
fect sizes. As shown in Figure 4, at large sample sizes
5Our actual implementation differs slightly from this. To
save time when running a huge number of tests with identical
n and , we first generate the reference distribution Wk values,
which can be reused across runs.
6We use the standard version of the test because it is the
one usually used. The Pratt variant has very similar power.
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Figure 2: Power at various values of  and sample
size n. (Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ; α = .05)
Figure 3: Power at various values of  and sample size
n. (Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ; α = .05; proportion of
zeroes in di is .3)
n, in this case 2500, there is essentially no difference
between the minimum effect detectable in the private
and public setting. This is because the random vari-
ation in the sample overwhelms the relatively small
random noise being added for privacy. We also note,
while not shown in the figure, that for small enough
choices of n and  no effect, no matter how large, can
be detected. (Once all di values are positive, increas-
ing the effect size further has no effect.)
Figure 4: Power at various values of  and effect size.
(α = .05, n = 2500)
6 Comparison to Previous Work
In 2016, Task and Clifton [23] introduced the first
differentially private version of the Wilcoxon signed-
rank test, from here on referred to as the TC test.
Our work improves upon their test in two ways. We
describe the two key differences below, and then com-
pare the power of our test to theirs. We also found a
significant error in their work.7 All comparisons are
made to our implementation of the TC test with the
relevant error corrected.
Computing critical values Task and Clifton
compute an analytic upper bound on the critical
value t∗. For a given n and , the private test statis-
tic W˜ under H0 is equal to a sum W + Λ, where W
is a random draw from a normal distribution (scaled
according to n) and Λ is a Laplace random variable
(scaled according to n and ). In particular, say that
b is a value such that Pr[W > b] < β and g is a value
such that Pr[Λ > g] < γ. Then we can compute the
following bound. (The last line follows from the fact
7This error has been confirmed by Task and Clifton in per-
sonal correspondence.
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that the two events are independent.)
Pr[W˜ > b+ g] < Pr[W > b or Λ > g]
= Pr[W > b] + Pr[Λ > g]
− Pr[W > b and Λ > g]
= β + γ − βγ
Task and Clifton always set γ = .01 and then vary
the choice of β such that they have α = β+γ−βγ for
whatever α is intended as the significance threshold.
(This is where Task and Clifton make an error. This
formula is correct, but they used an incorrect density
function for the Laplace distribution and as a result
calculated incorrect values of g.)
The bound described above is correct but is very
loose. We instead compute the critical value by sim-
ulation. We use 10 million draws from the relevant
distribution and compute the 1− α quantile of their
absolute values. This gives drastically lower critical
values. Table 4 contains examples of the critical val-
ues achieved by each method for several parameter
choices. More values can be found in Appendix B.
Table 4: Critical Value Comparison for n = 100
 α Public New TC
1 0.1 1.282 1.417 2.680
0.05 1.645 1.826 3.091
0.025 1.960 2.186 3.511
0.1 0.1 1.282 5.684 14.786
0.05 1.645 8.063 15.197
0.025 1.960 10.438 15.617
0.01 0.1 1.282 55.350 135.843
0.05 1.645 79.233 136.254
0.025 1.960 103.116 136.674
Critical values for n = 100 and several values of  and
α. To allow easy comparison, these values are for a
normalized W statistic, i.e., W has been divided by
the relevant constant so that it is (before the addi-
tion of Laplacian noise) distributed according to a
standard normal. See Appendix B for the equivalent
table at n = 1000.
Handling zero values Our second key change
from the TC test is that we handle rows with di = 0
according to the Pratt variant of the Wilcoxon, rather
than dropping them completely as is more tradi-
tional. The reason the traditional method is so dif-
ficult in the private setting is that the reference dis-
tribution one must compare to depends on the num-
ber of rows that were dropped. If nr is the number
of non-zero rows (i.e., rows that weren’t dropped),
one is supposed to look up the critical value associ-
ated with nr, rather than the original size n of the
database.
Unfortunately, nr is a sensitive value and cannot
be released privately.8 Task and Clifton show that it
is acceptable (in that it does not result in type I error
greater than α) to compare to a critical value for a
value of nr that is lower than the actual value. This
allows them to give two options for how one might
deal with the lack of knowledge about nr.
High Utility This version of the TC test simply as-
sumes nr ≥ .3n and uses the critical value that
would be correct for nr = .3n. We stress that
this algorithm is not actually differentially pri-
vate, though it could easily be captured by a
sufficiently weakened definition that limited the
universe of allowable databases. Another prob-
lem is that for most realistic data, nr is much
greater than .3n and using this loose lower bound
still results in a large loss of power.
High Privacy This version adds k dummy values
to the database with di = ∞ and k with di =
−∞.9 Then one can be certain of the bound
nr ≥ 2k. This is a guaranteed bound so this
variant truly satisfies differential privacy. On the
other hand it is a very loose lower bound in most
cases, leading to a large loss of power.
8A private estimate could be released, but one would have
to devote a significant portion of the privacy budget for the
hypothesis test to this estimate, greatly decreasing the accu-
racy/power of W˜.
9Task and Clifton do not discuss how to choose k, and in
our experimental comparisons we set k = 15, the same value
they use.
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Experimental results We compare our test to the
TC test by measuring statistical power, just as we
compared it to the public test in Section 5. We begin
by again measuring the power when detecting the dif-
ference between two normal distributions with means
one standard deviation apart. The results can be seen
in Figure 5. If we look at the database size needed to
achieve 80% power, we find that the 32 data points
we need, while more than the public test (14), are
many fewer than the TC high utility variant (80) or
the TC high privacy variant (122). Appendix B in-
cludes a figure for  = .01 as well. What we see is
that, while all private tests require more data, our
test (requiring n ≈ 236) still requires about 40% as
much data as the TC high utility variant (588). The
TC high privacy variant, however, scales much less
well to low  and requires roughly 2974 data points.
Figure 5: Power comparison of TC’s [23] algorithms,
our new algorithm, and the public algorithm at vari-
ous n. (Effect size: µu − µv = 1σ,  = 1; α = .05
)
The results in Figure 5 use a continuous distribu-
tion for the real data, so there are no data points with
di = 0. Because one of the crucial differences between
our algorithms is the method for handling these zero
values, we also consider the effect when there are a
large number of zeros. In particular, Figures 6 and
7 compare our algorithm to the high utility and high
privacy variants of the TC test, respectively. Here
we first choose the number of rows with di = 0 and
then sample the remaining data points as before. Of
course, as the number of rows showing no difference
increases, the power of all tests decreases, but we see
that in all cases our test retains power longer.
Figure 6: Power comparison of the TC High Utility
algorithm and our algorithm at various proportions of
tied values and sample sizes n. (Effect size: µu−µv =
1σ;  = 1; α = .05)
Figure 7: Power comparison of the TC High Privacy
algorithm (k = 15) and our algorithm at various pro-
portions of tied values and sample sizes n. (Effect
size: µu − µv = 1σ;  = 1; α = .05)
Overall, we see that both in situations with no zero
values and situations with many, our test achieves the
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rigorous privacy guarantees of the TC high privacy
test while achieving greater utility than the TC high
utility test.
Relative contribution of improvements Given
that we make two meaningful changes to the TC test,
one might naturally wonder whether both are truly
useful or whether the vast majority of the improve-
ment comes from one of the two changes. To test
this, we compare to an updated variant of the TC
test where we calculate critical values exactly through
simulation, as we do in our algorithm, but otherwise
run the TC test unchanged. The result is presented in
Figure 8. ”High Privacy +” and ”High Utility +”, in
Figure 8, refer to algorithms using our critical value
computation and their methods of handling data as
stated before.
Figure 8: Power comparison of the TC algorithms,
the TC algorithms with our critical values (denoted
with a +), our new algorithm, and the public al-
gorithm at various sample sizes n. (Effect size:
µu − µv = 1σ;  = 1; α = .05)
We find the resulting algorithm to rest comfortably
between the original TC test and our proposed test.
This means that both the change to the critical value
calculation and the switch to the Pratt method of
handling di = 0 rows are important contributions to
achieving the power of our test.
7 Application to Real-World Data
We now demonstrate the use of our algorithm on real-
world data. We use a database of New York City tax
ride information released in 2014. The database con-
tains information on every Yellow Taxi ride in New
York City in 2013, and its release resulted in high-
profile de-anonymization attacks [29]. Our main find-
ing is that (at least for some natural analyses that
we attempt) a differentially private query interface
would have been sufficient, and the release of the
data set was unnecessary. We also again compare
our statistical power to that of the TC tests and find
it superior.10
This dataset contains several variables of interest
for every Yellow Taxi ride in New York City in 2013,
of which the following will be most useful:
• Hack License: a unique identifier for every taxi
driver in the city
• Number of Passengers: how many people rode
together in the taxi
• Trip Time: the duration of the ride in seconds
• Trip Distance: the total distance traveled during
the ride
We subsetted this dataset, initially, to include rides
occuring on January 1st and 2nd of 2013. Then, we
only kept rides given by a driver who drove on both
the 1st and the 2nd. In one data set, ui and vi were
the average trip time on the 1st and 2nd, respectively.
The Wilcoxon test can then be used to test whether
trip time varied between the two days. We calculated
two other data sets similarly for trip distance and
number of passengers.
The resulting data sets have 17,066 entries. We
sampled (with replacement) 105 different smaller
datasets of size n = 400. Finally, we ran each al-
gorithm on each of these resulting data sets and re-
port the proportion in which a significant result (at
α = .05) was found. The results are summarized in
Figure 9.
10This data set is the same one Task and Clifton originally
use for evaluating their test.
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Figure 9: Power of the TC tests, our test, and the
public test at sample sizes of 400, sampled with re-
placement from the NYC taxi data. ( = 1; α = .05)
The power of our test follows the public test closely,
and we see that for a data set as small as 400, we can
achieve results with a private query that are almost
as useful as a full public release of the data. The
TC algorithms do not achieve this goal, though the
high utility variant is still meaningfully useful. Of
course, there will be choices of n and  for which the
gap between our power and the power of the public
test is quite large, but our point here is to argue that
for even reasonably small data sets a private query
interface can be sufficient for many important tasks.
8 Conclusion and Open Questions
We have shown a new private variant of the Wilcoxon
hypothesis test complete with an accurate method
for computing p-values. It contains two significant
technical innovations over prior work. We show that
this test has much higher power than the previously
available tests, and (at least for  = 1) its power is
actually not very far from that of the public test.
We also show that it is a realistic algorithm to run
on at least some real-world data sets at reasonable
database sizes for many applications. We think this
is a major step forward, but several questions remain
open.
The most obvious goal is simply to continue im-
proving the power of the test. The gap between our
test and the public test is still significant when  is
meaningfully less than 1.
It would also be useful to compare this test to
other tests in the statistics literature. For example,
if one knows that the underlying data is drawn from
a normal distribution, classical statistics would use a
paired-sample t-test, which is known to have higher
power in this case than the Wilcoxon. We suspect
that the Wilcoxon test holds up better under the con-
straints of differential privacy and that it might actu-
ally be better in the private setting to use the private
Wilcoxon even when the data is known to be nor-
mally distributed. Unfortunately, to our knowledge
no one has yet developed a private analogue of the
t-test, so we are unable to make the comparison.11
11This material is based upon work supported by the Na-
tional Science Foundation under Grant No. SaTC-1817245
and the Richter Funds.
13
References
[1] Michael Barbaro and Tom Zeller Jr. A face is
exposed for aol searcher no. 4417749. The New
York Times, page A1, Aug 2006.
[2] Andre´s F Barrientos, Jerome P Reiter, Ashwin
Machanavajjhala, and Yan Chen. Differentially
private significance tests for regression coeffi-
cients. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.09561, 2017.
[3] Zachary Campbell, Andrew Bray, Anna M. Ritz,
and Adam Groce. Differentially private anova
testing. 2018 1st International Conference on
Data Intelligence and Security (ICDIS), pages
281–285, 2018.
[4] Kamalika Chaudhuri, Claire Monteleoni, and
Anand D Sarwate. Differentially private em-
pirical risk minimization. Journal of Machine
Learning Research, 12(Mar):1069–1109, 2011.
[5] William Jay Conover. On methods of han-
dling ties in the wilcoxon signed-rank test.
Journal of the American Statistical Association,
68(344):985–988, 1973.
[6] Bolin Ding, Harsha Nori, Paul Li, and Joshua
Allen. Comparing population means under lo-
cal differential privacy: With significance and
power, 2018.
[7] Vito D’Orazio, James Honaker, and Gary King.
Differential privacy for social science inference.
2015.
[8] Cynthia Dwork, Frank McSherry, Kobbi Nissim,
and Adam Smith. Calibrating noise to sensitiv-
ity in private data analysis. In Theory of Cryp-
tography Conference, pages 265–284. Springer,
2006.
[9] Stephen E Fienberg, Aleksandra Slavkovic, and
Caroline Uhler. Privacy preserving gwas data
sharing. In Data Mining Workshops (ICDMW),
2011 IEEE 11th International Conference on,
pages 628–635. IEEE, 2011.
[10] Marco Gaboardi, Hyun-Woo Lim, Ryan M
Rogers, and Salil P Vadhan. Differentially pri-
vate chi-squared hypothesis testing: Goodness of
fit and independence testing. In ICML’16 Pro-
ceedings of the 33rd International Conference on
International Conference on Machine Learning-
Volume 48. JMLR, 2016.
[11] Nils Homer, Szabolcs Szelinger, Margot Red-
man, David Duggan, Waibhav Tembe, Jill
Muehling, John V Pearson, Dietrich A Stephan,
Stanley F Nelson, and David W Craig. Re-
solving individuals contributing trace amounts
of dna to highly complex mixtures using high-
density snp genotyping microarrays. PLoS ge-
netics, 4(8):e1000167, 2008.
[12] Aaron Johnson and Vitaly Shmatikov. Privacy-
preserving data exploration in genome-wide
association studies. In Proceedings of the
19th ACM SIGKDD international conference on
Knowledge discovery and data mining, pages
1079–1087. ACM, 2013.
[13] Thoˆng T Nguyeˆn and Siu Cheung Hui. Differ-
entially private regression for discrete-time sur-
vival analysis. In Proceedings of the 2017 ACM
on Conference on Information and Knowledge
Management, pages 1199–1208. ACM, 2017.
[14] John W Pratt. Remarks on zeros and ties in the
wilcoxon signed rank procedures. Journal of the
American Statistical Association, 54(287):655–
667, 1959.
[15] Ryan Rogers and Daniel Kifer. A new class of
private chi-square hypothesis tests. In Artifi-
cial Intelligence and Statistics, pages 991–1000,
2017.
[16] Or Sheffet. Differentially private ordinary least
squares. arXiv preprint arXiv:1507.02482, 2015.
[17] Or Sheffet. Differentially private ordinary
least squares: Estimation, confidence, and re-
jecting the null hypothesis. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1507.02482, 2015.
14
[18] Adam Smith. Efficient, differentially pri-
vate point estimators. arXiv preprint
arXiv:0809.4794, 2008.
[19] Adam Smith. Privacy-preserving statistical esti-
mation with optimal convergence rates. In Pro-
ceedings of the forty-third annual ACM sympo-
sium on Theory of computing, pages 813–822.
ACM, 2011.
[20] Eftychia Solea. Differentially private hypothesis
testing for normal random variables. 2014.
[21] Ben Stoddard, Yan Chen, and Ashwin
Machanavajjhala. Differentially private al-
gorithms for empirical machine learning. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1411.5428, 2014.
[22] Latanya Sweeney. k-anonymity: A model for
protecting privacy. International Journal of Un-
certainty, Fuzziness and Knowledge-Based Sys-
tems, 10(05):557–570, 2002.
[23] Christine Task and Chris Clifton. Differentially
private significance testing on paired-sample
data. In Proceedings of the 2016 SIAM Interna-
tional Conference on Data Mining, pages 153–
161. SIAM, 2016.
[24] Caroline Uhlerop, Aleksandra Slavkovic´, and
Stephen E Fienberg. Privacy-preserving data
sharing for genome-wide association studies. The
Journal of privacy and confidentiality, 5(1):137,
2013.
[25] Duy Vu and Aleksandra Slavkovic. Differen-
tial privacy for clinical trial data: Preliminary
evaluations. In Data Mining Workshops, 2009.
ICDMW’09. IEEE International Conference on,
pages 138–143. IEEE, 2009.
[26] Yue Wang, Jaewoo Lee, and Daniel Kifer. Dif-
ferentially private hypothesis testing, revisited.
CoRR, abs/1511.03376, 2015.
[27] Yue Wang, Jaewoo Lee, and Daniel Kifer.
Revisiting differentially private hypothesis
tests for categorical data. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1511.03376, 2015.
[28] Larry Wasserman and Shuheng Zhou. A statis-
tical framework for differential privacy. Jour-
nal of the American Statistical Association,
105(489):375–389, 2010.
[29] Chris Whong. FOILing NYC’s taxi trip data.
2014.
[30] Frank Wilcoxon. Individual comparisons by
ranking methods. Biometrics Bulletin, 1(6):80–
83, 1945.
[31] Fei Yu, Michal Rybar, Caroline Uhler, and
Stephen E Fienberg. Differentially private logis-
tic regression for detecting multiple-snp associa-
tion in gwas databases. In International Confer-
ence on Privacy in Statistical Databases, pages
170–184. Springer, 2014.
[32] Jun Zhang, Zhenjie Zhang, Xiaokui Xiao, Yin
Yang, and Marianne Winslett. Functional mech-
anism: Regression analysis under differential
privacy. Proceedings of the VLDB Endowment,
5(11):1364–1375, 2012.
15
A Uniformity of p-values
The uniformity of p-values for a hypothesis test can
be assessd by simulating many p-values and evaluat-
ing how well they follow the uniform distribution on
the unit interval. A common tool for this purpose is
the quantile-quantile (or Q-Q) plot, which plots the
quantiles of the theoretical distribution (the uniform
in this case) against the empirical quantiles of the
p-values. A sample that perfectly follows the theo-
retical distribution will coincide at all quantiles and
be represented on the Q-Q plot as the identity line.
Figure 10 shows a Q-Q plot of three sets of p-
values, all generated under H0, with  = 1, n = 500.
When there are no ties in the original data (0% of
di = 0), the Q-Q plot line is indistinguishable from
the identity line, indicating that the test is properly
calibrated. Encouragingly, introducing a substantial
number of ties into the data (30% of di = 0) has no
noticible effect.
In order to induce non-uniformity in the p-values,
one needs an extremely high proportion of rows with
di = 0. The curve with 90% zero values is shown as
an illustration. When the proportion of zeros is very
high, the variance of the p-values will be narrower
than the reference distribution, resulting in a lower
critical value. Since the value we are using is higher,
our test is overly conservative,12 but this is acceptable
as type I error is still below α.
12One could try to estimate the number of zeros to be less
conservative, but that would require allocating some of the
privacy budget towards that estimate, which is not worth it in
most circumstances.
Figure 10: A quantile-quantile plot comparing the
distribution of simulated p-values to the uniform dis-
tribution ( = 1, n = 500).
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B Additional Figures
B.1 Power Comparison
Figure 11: Power comparison of Task and Clifton’s
algorithms, our new algorithm, and the public al-
gorithm at various database sizes n. (Effect size:
µu − µv = 1σ;  = .1; α = .05)
B.2 Critical Value Tables
Table 5: Critical Value Comparison for n = 1000
 α Public New TC
1 0.1 1.282 1.296 1.763
0.05 1.645 1.665 2.174
0.025 1.960 1.984 2.594
0.1 0.1 1.282 2.203 5.617
0.05 1.645 2.975 6.028
0.025 1.960 3.740 6.448
0.01 0.1 1.282 17.681 44.157
0.05 1.645 25.234 44.568
0.025 1.960 32.844 44.988
Critical values for n = 1000 and several values of 
and α. To allow easy comparison, these values are for
a normalized W statistic, i.e., W has been divided by
the relevant constant so that it is (before the addi-
tion of Laplacian noise) distributed according to a
standard normal.
Table 6: New Critical Value Table for  = 1.0
n 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005
10 70 83 102 116
20 155 183 220 248
30 256 299 355 397
40 369 429 506 562
50 494 572 670 742
75 854 984 1143 1257
100 1271 1460 1690 1853
200 3402 3895 4486 4900
300 6127 7012 8069 8798
400 9335 10679 12276 13382
500 12978 14845 17061 18592
1000 36235 41443 47637 51906
Critical values at several sample sizes n and two-sided
significance levels α. To calcuate these values, we
run 10 million simulations for each parameter com-
bination and compute the 1 − αth percentile of the
absolute value of the distribution.
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Table 7: New Critical Value Table for  = 0.1
n 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005
10 600 739 922 1061
20 1202 1479 1846 2123
30 1806 2220 2770 3185
40 2413 2968 3704 4261
50 3018 3713 4628 5324
75 4541 5577 6954 7989
100 6073 7461 9294 10677
200 12328 15098 18767 21531
300 18733 22892 28391 32519
400 25296 30837 38193 43736
500 32054 38979 48128 55083
1000 68258 82120 100408 114230
Critical values at several sample sizes n and two-sided
significance levels α. To calcuate these values, we
run 10 million simulations for each parameter com-
bination and compute the 1 − αth percentile of the
absolute value of the distribution.
Table 8: New Critical Value Table for  = 0.01
n 0.05 0.025 0.01 0.005
10 5992 7377 9209 10596
20 11971 14742 18416 21196
30 17976 22137 27644 31774
40 23974 29516 36877 42425
50 29964 36905 46081 53034
75 44933 55371 69105 79513
100 59921 73792 92066 106005
200 119902 147619 184222 212010
300 179942 221477 276678 317895
400 239695 295106 368374 423528
500 299627 368763 460256 529522
1000 600096 738071 921529 1061150
Critical values at several sample sizes n and two-sided
significance levels α. To calcuate these values, we
run 10 million simulations for each parameter com-
bination and compute the 1 − αth percentile of the
absolute value of the distribution.
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